We show that Intuitionistic Open Induction iop is not closed under the rule DN S(∃ − 1 ). This is established by constructing a Kripke model of iop+¬L y (2y > x), where L y (2y > x) is universally quantified on x. On the other hand, we prove that iop is equivalent with the intuitionistic theory axiomatized by P A − plus the scheme of weak ¬¬LN P for open formulas, where universal quantification on the parameters precedes double negation. We also show that for any open formula ϕ(y) having only y free, (P A − ) i L y ϕ(y). We observe that the theories iop, i∀ 1 and iΠ 1 are closed under Friedman's translation by negated formulas and so under V R and IP . We include some remarks on the classical worlds in Kripke models of iop.
Preliminaries
1.1 Let DOR (resp. P A − ) be the finite set of usual axioms (including Trichotomy) for discretely ordered commutative rings with 1 (resp. their nonnegative parts) in the language L = {+, ·, < , 0, 1} of arithmetic. Peano Arithmetic P A (resp. Heyting Arithmetic HA) is the classical (resp. intuitionistic, obtained by dropping the principle P EM of excluded middle whose instance P EM ϕ on a formula ϕ is ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) first order theory axiomatized by P A − together with the induction scheme whose instance with respect to a distinguished free variable x on a formula ϕ(x, y) is I x ϕ = I x ϕ(x, y) : ∀y(ϕ(0, y) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x, y) → ϕ(x + 1, y)) → ∀xϕ(x, y)).
The classical Open Induction fragment
Iop of P A is axiomatized by only keeping (besides P A − ) the instances of induction on open, i.e. quantifier-free, formulas. It was first studied by Shepherdson [Sh] . He constructed a (recursive) nonstandard model proving independence results, such as irrationality of √ 2, from Iop. LetQ be the field of real algebraic numbers. Shepherdson's model was n ∈ Z >0 , m ∈ N, a m , · · · , a 1 ∈Q, a 0 ∈ Z, a m ≥ 0, m > 0 → a m > 0}. This is equipped with the obvious + and · and the (non-Archimedean and consistent with + and ·) order induced by t > N. We will use Shepherdson's model and also some later results regarding Iop (see, e.g., [MM] and [Wi] ) in this paper. Our work continues the study (initiated in [AM] ) of the fragment Intuitionistic Open Induction, iop, of HA. Some of the results will also be shown to hold for certain stronger fragments of HA as well.
1.3
We adopt the usual Kripke semantics for intuitionistic theories based on L. A Kripke structure K for L has a frame P which is a rooted poset whose partial order is called accessibility. Elements of P are called nodes of K. To each node α of K is attached a classical structure M α for L in which the interpretation of equality is an L-congruence relation which may properly extend the true equality. For any two nodes α, β, if β is accessible from α (that is α ≤ β), then the world at α must be a weak substructure of the one at β. This means M β preserves truth in M α of atomic sentences in L α (the extended language obtained by adding new constant symbols for elements of M α ) although tuples of elements of M α may acquire new atomic properties, perhaps equality, in M β . An atomic L α -sentence is forced at α whenever it is satisfied in M α . The inductive definitions of forcing for ∨, ∧, ∃ is the same as the corresponding ones for satisfaction or truth in classical structures, while it is stronger for → and ∀ as it requires the similar classical defining clause to hold at every accessible node. By α ϕ(x), one means α ∀xϕ(x). No node forces absurdity ⊥, and ¬A is defined as A →⊥. One says that α decides ϕ whenever α P EM ϕ . If K P EM atomic , then one can assume that the interpretation of equality in the worlds of K is the true one and for any two nodes α ≤ β, M α is a substructure of M β .
1.4
The instance of the least number principle LN P with respect to a distinguished free variable x on a formula ϕ(x, y) is the sentence
Let Lop (resp. lop) denote the classical (resp. intuitionistic) theory axiomatized by P A − together with the scheme LN P restricted to open formulas. 1 By I t op (resp. i t op) we mean the classical (resp. intuitionistic) theory based on P A − plus the scheme of transfinite induction
for open ϕ.
1 Observe that these instances are universal closures of the corresponding ones as appeared in [TD, p.129 ]. We will be dealing with double negations of instances of the two schemes in sections 3 and 6, there will be cases where just the weaker doubly negated scheme (the one in which ¬¬ succeeds all ∀'s) is provable.
For a set Γ of formulas, notations such as iΓ, IΓ, LΓ and i t Γ should now be understood similarly by replacing the class of open formulas by Γ.
Formula classes ∀ 1 , ∃ 1 , ∆ 0 , Π 1 , Σ 1 and Π 2 are defined as usual. E.g., by a ∀ 1 -formula one means a formula of the form ∀xϕ(x, y) where ϕ is open, while Π 1 -formulas have the above form with ϕ ∈ ∆ 0 . Our use of the word prenex is two-fold, a block of quantifiers followed by either an open or a ∆ 0 -formula, depending on the context.
1.5
For a set of axioms T , we denote its classical (resp. intuitionistic) deductive closure by T c (resp. T i ). Every intuitionistic theory (being its own intuitionistic deductive closure) can be written in this form. A T -normal Kripke structure means one whose worlds are classical models of T . The intuitionistic theory of the class of T -normal Kripke structures is denoted H(T ). It was shown in [AM, 1.2(ii, iii), 1.4, 2.3(ii) ] that Kripke models of lop (resp. (P A − ) i ) are precisely the Iop-normal (resp. P A − -normal) ones and lop is strictly stronger than iop. Therefore any intuitionistic theory strictly weaker than lop (and in particular iop) is sound but not complete with respect to Iop-normal Kripke structures (since the intuitionistic theory which is sound and complete with respect to this class is H(Iop) = lop). Let AEO, U AEO, and AU EO be the sentences ∀x∃y(x = 2y ∨ x = 2y + 1), ¬¬AEO, and ∀x¬¬∃y(x = 2y ∨ x = 2y + 1) respectively. It is also true that no fragment of i∀ 1 extending (P A − ) i is complete with respect to the class of its end-extension Kripke models. Every end-extension Kripke model of (P A − ) i forces U AEO → AEO but, as the proof of [AM 2.3 (ii) ] shows, i∀ 1 U AEO → AEO.
1.6
The set ZR of axioms for Z-rings is DOR together with the scheme
for standard integers n ≥ 2. Let ZR + be obtained from ZR by replacing DOR by P A − . Clearly P A − + I y (yz ≤ x) c ∀x∀z = 0∃y∃r(0 ≤ r < z ∧ x = yz + r) and so Iop ZR + .
1.7
Let ¬¬iop denote the intuitionistic theory axiomatized by (P A − ) i +{¬¬I x ϕ : ϕ is open}. The theories ¬¬i∀ 1 and ¬¬lop are defined similarly, by either replacing the class of open formulas by ∀ 1 -formulas or the induction scheme by LNP. Also, ¬¬iΠ 1 will stand for the intuitionistic theory axiomatized by i∆ 0 + {¬¬I x ϕ : ϕ ∈ Π 1 }. For any set T of formulas, we denote {¬¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ T } by U T .
1.8
We say that T i is closed under Friedman's translation if whenever T i ϕ and ψ is a formula which has no free variables bound in ϕ, then T i ϕ ψ . Here ϕ ψ , Friedman's translation of ϕ by ψ, is obtained by replacing each atomic subformula ρ of ϕ by ρ ∨ ψ. It is easy to see that for any axiom σ of P A − and any formula ϕ, σ σ ϕ . In particular, (P A − ) i is closed under Friedman's translation. On the other hand iop, i∀ 1 and iΠ 1 are not, see [AM, 2.3(iii) ] and [We2, Cor. 5 ].
We say that T i is closed under the rule DN S of double negation shift whenever T i ∀x¬¬ϕ(x) implies T i ¬¬∀xϕ(x). It has the Disjunction Property DP if for all sentences φ and ψ, T i ϕ ∨ ψ implies T i ϕ or T i ψ. The theory T i has the property ED of Existential Definability whenever for all formulas ϕ(x) with T i ∃xϕ(x), there exists a term t such that T i ϕ(t). It is closed under the negative translation whenever it proves the negative translation of any formula it proves classically. Recall that the negative translation of a formula is obtained by replacing any subformula of the form ψ ∨ η, resp. ∃xψ, by ¬(¬ψ ∧ ¬η), resp. ¬∀x¬ψ and inserting ¬¬ in front of all atomic sub-formulas, except ⊥. It was shown in [AM, 2.4] 
Worlds in Kripke Models of iop
In this section, we characterize classical structures at the nodes of Kripke models of iop as those models of P A − which generate a ring embedable in a Z-ring and construct an ω-framed Kripke model of iop with no worlds satisfying Iop. We also show that iop has limited prenex or semipositive consequences. A semipositive formula is one all whose implicational subformulas have atomic antecedent.
Proposition 2.1 If T i decides atomic formulas and is closed under the negative translation, then
(ii) Each world of any Kripke model of T i can be embedded in a model of T c .
(iii) If T is ∃-free, then any model of conseq ∀ 1 (T c ) is realizable as a world in some Kripke model of T i .
Proof (i) Suppose that ϕ is an open formula and T c ∀xϕ(x). Then
(ii) By [Ho, Cor. 6.5.3] it is enough to show any such world D is a model of conseq ∀ 1 (T c ). By part (i), any ∀ 1 -consequence of T c is provable in T i and is therefore forced at the node corresponding to D. Now by decidability of atomic formulas and the formula being prenex, it is satisfied in D (see [Ma, lemma 1(iii) 
]).
(iii) Any model of conseq ∀ 1 (T c ) is, by [Ho, Cor. 6.5 .3] again, embedable in a classical model of T . The Kripke model obtained by putting the latter over the former forces T i .
Corollary 2.2
Iop is ∀ 1 -conservative over iop and I∀ 1 is ∀ 1 -conservative over i∀ 1 .
A similar sort of argument shows that IΠ 1 is Π 1 -conservative over iΠ 1 . (ii) M can be embedded in a model of Iop.
(iii) The ring generated by M satisfies classical ∀ 1 -consequences of ZR.
(iv) For each prime p, there exists a ring-homomorphism from the ring generated by M to the ring of p-adic integers.
Proof We know from proposition 2.1 that (i) and (ii) are equivalent. By [MM, 1.4, 1.5, 3A, 3B] , parts (ii), (iv) and embedability of the ring generated by M in a Z-ring are equivalent. The latter is, once more by [Ho, Cor. 6.5.3] , equivalent to (iii). Proposition 2.4 (i) ZR c ∀x, y(x 2 + 1 = 4y).
(ii) DOR c ∀x, y(x 2 + 1 = 4y).
(iii) The model Z[u,
4 ] ≥0 of P A − is not realizable as a world in any Kripke model of iop. Proof (i) In fact DOR + AEO classically proves the universal formula above.
(ii) Consider the ring D = Z[u,
4 ] under the order inherited from Q[u], with u positive and infinitely large. To prove its discreteness, suppose f (x, y) = 0≤i,j≤m a i,j x i y j ∈ Z[x, y] and 0 < f (u, (iii) Using corollary 2.3 (equivalence of (i) and (iii)), this is clear from (i) and the proof of (ii) above.
Proof Consider the two-node Kripke model obtained by putting Shepherdson's model above
Proposition 2.6 There exists an ω-framed Kripke model of iop with no worlds satisfying Iop. 2
Proof Consider the ω-framed Kripke structure K with M n = (t
n! ] + Z) ≥0 attached to node n. For any n, M n P A − and t 1 n!+1 ∈ M n . These imply M n I x (x n!+1 ≤ t) and so M n Iop. Observe that for each n, (1) M n is a substructure of M n+1 (since t
an open formula ϕ(x, y). For 0 I x ϕ(x, y) to hold, it suffices (see [AM, 1.1(i), 1.2(iii)]) that for every n and every b ∈ M n , there exists m ≥ n such that ∀k ≥ m :
, then m = n works. Otherwise, consider the least (necessarily nonzero) element u ∈ S t (N) such that S t (N) |= ¬ϕ(u, b) and suppose that l is the least nonnegative integer such that u ∈ M l . Then m = max{l, n} works.
Wehmeier proved some limitation on Π 2 -consequences of iΠ 1 in [We2, thm. 5] . His arguments show that I∆ 0 + conseq Π 1 (IΠ 1 ) c conseq prenex (iΠ 1 ) + conseq semipositive (iΠ 1 ). In the following proposition, we show a similar sort of limitations for iop. Proposition 2.7 (i) If ϕ is a semipositive or a prenex sentence and iop ϕ,
Proof (i) Once again, by [Ho, Cor. 6.5.3] , it suffices to show that ϕ is satisfied in any classical model of P A − whose generated ring is embedable in a Z-ring. This is clear on the basis of corollary 2.3, [Ma, Lemma 1(iii) ] and [We1, Lemma 1.2].
(ii) Clear from (i) and corollary 2.2, since Iop ZR + and P A − is ∀ 2 -axiomatized.
If we extend the language by the modified subtraction−, then replacing the only axiom
we get a ∀ 1 -axiomatized definitional extension of (P A − ) i , see [TD, 2.7.2] . Therefore, the sets of universal consequences and of prenex consequences of intuitionistic open induction in this expanded language, will be classically equivalent.
Examples 2.8 (i) We have iop P (2), where P (2) is the sentence ∀uvw∃x(2u = vw → (2x = v ∨ 2x = w)). The reason is that the ring Z[t,
(ii) Smith asks in [Smi, 5.1] whether Iop proves the first case of Fermat's Last Theorem for exponents n ≥ 3, that is for a given integer n ≥ 3, whether Iop (?) 1F LT (n). Here 1F LT (n) is ∀xyz∃u(x n + y n = z n → nu = xyz). To see that the intuitionistic version of this has a negative answer, put
3 iop fails the rule DN S(∃ 
, where x is the distinguished free variable in ψ m , then let s i,j,m = 0. Otherwise, let s i,j,m be the least element in S t (N) for which
Consider the Kripke structure on frame ω with M k attached to node k. We want to show that for any m, 0 I x ψ m (x, y). Fix i ≥ 0 and let p i,j ∈ M i , of the same arity as the number of non-distinguished free variables in ψ m , be arbitrary. We need to show i I x ψ m (x, p i,j ). By [AM 1.2(iii), 1.1(i)], it suffices to prove the following claim:
Proof of Claim 1 The assumption k
Otherwise, by construction, the second conjunct of the antecedent of I x ψ m (x, p i,j ) fails in M k+1 and so I x ψ m (x, p i,j ) itself holds there. This establishes claim 1.
Modifying the above Kripke model, we build a slowed-down ω-framed Kripke model of iop for which we verify in claim 2 the existence of infinitely many worlds satisfying ¬AEO. Now since the sentence AEO is ∀ 2 , that model will force ¬AEO and we will be done with the proposition (as a matter of fact, we will show in proposition 3.4, based on Hilbert's basis theorem, that all the worlds model ¬AEO).
Consider the above construction with the minor modification that each stage is divided into a number of substages, each of which treats just one formula and one tuple (keeping ω as the index set for stages of construction).
Claim 2 The slowed-down Kripke model has infinitely many worlds classically satisfying ¬AEO.
Proof of Claim 2
We inductively define a strictly increasing infinite sequence of nonnegative integers each of which labels a desired world. Let n 0 = 0 (observe that t is neither even nor odd in M 0 ). Assuming n k is defined for some k ≥ 0, let n k+1 be the least positive integer such that M n k+1 = M n k+1 −1 [rt q , where (p, q) = 1, is q. More generally, depth of a finite sum of such terms is the least common multiple of those of its terms. To see that n k+1 exists for each k, first observe that maxdepth(M 0 ) = 1 while if M k+1 = M k [u], then maxdepth(M k+1 ) ≤ (maxdepth(M k ))(depth(u)). This implies that maxdepth(M n ) is finite for each n. Now, for each l greater than maximum depth of elements of M n k , the element t 1 l ∈ S t (N) enters into a world at some node (consider the formula x l ≤ t). 3
Fix any
We show that it is not even there either. Suppose not, i.e. assume for the purpose of a contradiction that
l , for some g ∈ M n k+1 −1 , b ∈ Z (g is the constant term of f and b is the constant term of the coefficient of z in f (z)). If g = 0, then 1 2 = b ∈ Z, contradiction. Otherwise, g must be a nonzero real algebraic multiple of t 1 l , which is again a contradiction. Proof It is easy to see that P A − + L y (2y > x) i AEO and so ¬¬lop U AEO. Proof Construct a Kripke model as in proposition 3.1 by replacing S t (N) by M . The statement in claim 1 of that proposition shows that the union of the worlds models Iop. 5 Assume for the purpose of a contradiction that some world models AEO. Put t 0 = t and t l+1 = t l 2 . The ascending chain of ideals (t 0 ) ⊆ (t 1 ) ⊆ (t 2 ) ⊆ · · · in the ring generated by that model must stop as, by Hilbert's basis theorem, every finitely generated ring is Noetherian. So, for some n ∈ N and some g in that world, 0 = (2g − 1)t n . But this is impossible as 2g − 1 = 0 and t n is infinitely large.
Friedman's Translation by Negated Formulas
In this section, we show that the theories iop, i∀ 1 , and iΠ 1 are closed under some restricted cases of Friedman's translation, most notably (for applications in the next section) by negated formulas.
Proposition 4.1 (i) If T i proves P EM atomic (resp. P EM ∆ 0 ) and has a reversely well founded Kripke model not forcing conseq ∀ 2 (T c ) (resp. conseq Π 2 (T c )), then T i is not closed under Friedman's translation.
(ii) If T i P EM atomic , then for all semipositive sentences σ and all sentences ρ, T i σ implies T i σ ρ .
(iii) The theories iop, i∀ 1 and iΠ 1 are closed under Friedman's translation by respectively open, ∀ 1 , and Π 1 -formulas.
Proof (i) From decidability of atomic (resp. ∆ 0 ) formulas in T i we get, as mentioned in [AM, 2.2] , that T c is ∀ 2 -conservative (resp. Π 2 -conservative) over H(T ). Now observe that a generalization of the arguments for HA in [We1, 9.2] implies that if a fragment T i of HA is closed under Friedman's translation, then every reversely well founded Kripke model of T i forces H(T ). 6
(ii) It suffices to show the following. Let ψ be a sentence and K a Kripke structure deciding atomic formulas. Then for any semipositive sentence ϕ we have: ∀α ∈ K(α ϕ ⇒ α ϕ ψ ). This can be shown by induction on ϕ, the less trivial cases in the induction step being the → and ∀ ones.
→: Suppose α ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 , where ϕ 1 is atomic. Let β ≥ α and β ϕ ψ 1 . We need to show β ϕ ψ 2 . If β ψ, then we will be done (since ψ i ϕ ψ 2 ). Otherwise, from β ϕ 1 ∨ ψ we get β ϕ 1 and so β ϕ 2 . Then by induction hypothesis on ϕ 2 , we get the result.
. By induction hypothesis, we get 5 When the process is applied to S t (N) and, as in 3.1 the infinitely large chosen element is the particular one t, the union is indeed S t (N), as this is known to be the minimal model of Iop which includes t.
6 By [AM, 2.1(iii)], if T i is closed under both Friedman's and the negative translations, then every Kripke model of T i forces H(T ). Here we paid less and got less.
β ϕ(b) ψ and so α ∀xϕ(x) ψ .
(iii) It is straightforward to see that for atomic formulas ϕ; arbitrary formulas ψ, η and θ; any * ∈ {∧, ∨, →} and z ∈ {x, y}, we have ∀z(I x ϕ(x, y)) ψ(z) = I x (ϕ(x, y) ∨ ψ(z)) and ∀z(I x (η(x, y) * θ(x, y))) ψ(z) = I x (η(x, y) ψ(z) * θ(x, y) ψ(z) ). Now use [DMKV, sec.1, fact (D) ] (or lemma 5.1 below) and [TD, exercise 2.1.4] .
Note that part (iii) of the above proposition can be considered as a special case of corollary 4.5 below.
Recall the two pruning lemmas in [DMKV] . The first one belongs to general Kripke-model theory. It says that if β is a node of a Kripke model K, ϕ and ψ are formulas in L β such that no free variables of ψ are bound in ϕ and β ψ, then β ϕ ψ iff β ψ ϕ. Here ψ denotes forcing in the Kripke structure K ψ obtained from the original one by pruning away nodes forcing ψ.
We say that a fragment T i of HA has the pruning property if whenever β is a node of a Kripke model of T i , ψ ∈ L β and β ψ, then β ψ T i . The second pruning lemma in [DMKV] states that HA has this property. As it was proved in [DMKV] for HA itself, a fragment of HA proving P EM atomic satisfies the pruning property if it is closed under Friedman's translation. Let us note that the converse is also true. Assume that T i has the pruning property and T i ϕ. Then pruning the nodes forcing ψ from a Kripke model of T i not forcing ψ would result in a model of T i and so for any remaining node α, α ψ ϕ. Therefore, by the first pruning lemma, it must have forced ϕ ψ originally. Note that the mentioned equivalence is indeed true formula by formula (for pruning or translating by).
Lemma 4.2 For any Kripke structure K, any sentence σ with K σ, and any formula ϕ, we have K ¬ϕ ¬ϕ ¬¬σ.
Proof Suppose K σ (σ an L-sentence) and α ∈ K ¬ϕ . For any β ≥ α with β ∈ K ¬ϕ , we have β ¬ϕ and so there exists γ ≥ β such that {δ ∈ K : δ ≥ γ} ⊆ K ¬ϕ . Therefore, from γ σ, we get γ ¬ϕ σ. This shows α ¬ϕ ¬¬σ.
Proof Consider the Kripke model obtained by putting a nonstandard model of Th(N) with an infinitely large positive element t over N [t] . The lower node does not force ∀x, y∃z(x ≤ y → x + z = y).
Lemma 4.4 For arbitrary formulas ϕ and ψ, we have: ¬¬∀y(ϕ(y) → ∀xψ(x, y)) + P EM ψ i ∀y(ϕ(y) → ∀xψ(x, y)).
Corollary 4.5 We have iop ≡ ¬¬iop, i∀ 1 ≡ ¬¬i∀ 1 , and iΠ 1 ≡ ¬¬iΠ 1 . These three theories are closed under Friedman's translation by negated formulas.
Proof Observe that each instance of induction in iop, i∀ 1 or iΠ 1 is of the form present in lemma 4.4 with ψ open or ∆ 0 . Also (P A − ) i P EM atomic and i∆ 0 P EM ∆ 0 . Therefore, we have the mentioned equivalences. Now to see their closure under Friedman's translation by negated formulas, first note that if K iop, then by 4.2, K ¬ψ ¬ψ U iop and since K ¬ψ is P A − -normal, K ¬ψ (P A − ) i . The proof for i∀ 1 is similar, while the one for iΠ 1 uses the criterion for Kripke models of i∆ 0 (being I∆ 0 -normal and ∆ 0 -elementary extension).
5 Closure under the rules V R and IP As mentioned above, we know that the theories iop, i∀ 1 and iΠ 1 are not closed under Friedman's translation. So, it would be of interest to investigate the validity of some of the consequences of closure under Friedman's translation, known to hold say for HA, in these cases.
A fragment T i of HA proving P EM ∆ 0 (resp. P EM atomic but not P EM ∆ 0 ) is said to be closed under Visser's Rule V R if whenever it proves ¬¬ϕ → ϕ, for a Σ 1 -formula (resp. ∃ 1 -formula) ϕ, then ϕ is decidable in T i . It was proved in [DMKV] that HA is closed under V R.
The Independence of Premises rule IP is proved for HA in [TD] . This asserts that if HA ¬ϕ → ∃yψ, with y not free in ϕ, then HA ∃y(¬ϕ → ψ). A restricted version where ϕ is a sentence and ψ has only y free is proved in [Dr, P.117] . The latter mentioned proof works for any fragment iΓ of HA, where Γ is a set of formulas. For, each theory iΓ has its class of Kripke models closed under Smorynski's operation Σ , see [Smo] . Besides this restricted IP , two further consequences of Σ -closure are closure under DP and ED.
It is also true that the class of Kripke models of lop is closed under Σ . For, by [AM, proof of 1.4] , models of lop are exactly Iop-normal Kripke structures.
Lemma 5.1 For any T i with decidable atomic formulas, any ∃ 1 -sentence ψ and arbitrary sentence ρ, we have
Proof This can be shown by an easy induction on the built-up of ψ. Alternatively, one can give a routine model-theoretic proof using the first pruning lemma and [AM, 1.1(ii)].
Theorem 5.2 The theories iop, i∀ 1 and iΠ 1 are closed under the rules V R and IP .
Proof For V R, by corollary 4.5 and lemma 5.1, the proof at the end of [DMKV] goes through. For IP , by corollary 4.5 again, the proof on p. 138-139 of [TD] works.
Notice that by [AM, 2.1(iv) ], lop = H(Iop) is closed under Friedman's translation. Therefore it is also closed under IP and V R.
Proposition 5.3 There exist sentences η, ρ, and ν such that:
(ii) The rule DP is not valid in iop + ρ.
(iii) The rule IP (even the above restricted version) is not valid in iop + ν.
Proof In this proof, we denote the sentence ∃x∃y ((x + 1) 2 = 2y 2 ) by Rational( √ 2).
as Σ applied to S t (N) and N shows.
(ii) We mention two groups of examples for such ρ's. Let ρ = τ ∨ ¬τ , where either:
(a) Iop τ and iop ¬¬τ (this happens, e.g., for τ = AEO as proposition 3.1 shows); or (b) Iop τ and Iop ¬τ (as it happens, e.g., for τ = Rational( √ 2)).
(iii) Consider ν : ¬AEO → Rational( √ 2) and the Kripke model K in the proof of proposition 3.4(ii) where Rational( √ 2) is forced. 7 Now let K 1 be the result of applying Σ to K and S t (N). It forces ν but not ∃y(¬AEO → ∃x(x + 1) 2 = 2y 2 ). To see this, note that for any l ∈ N, the nodes in K 1 forcing ¬AEO are those of K, none of which forces ∃x (x + 1) 2 = 2l 2 .
6 Some Remarks on W ¬¬LN P and I t We have already noticed that with the instances of LN P universally quantified out on the parameters, iop ¬¬L y (2y > x). On the other hand, we prove in this section that iop is equivalent with the intuitionistic theory axiomatized by P A − plus the scheme of weak ¬¬LN P for open formulas, where universal quantification on the parameters precedes double negation. We also show that (P A − ) i l 1 op. Here l 1 op is the fragment of lop restricting the open least number principle to (open) formulas with just one free variable. We finish the paper by making some remarks on the relation between the schemes I t and LN P .
Minimal logic, which appears in the next proposition, is the weakening of intuitionistic logic obtained by dropping the rule ⊥ i (which allows to conclude any formula from ⊥, once ⊥ has been proved with no discharged assumptions), see [TD] and [TS] . By m-provability, we mean provability in minimal logic.
Proposition 6.1 If a fragment iΓ of HA is m-closed under the negative translation and IΓ LΓ, then for any formula ϕ(x, y) ∈ Γ, iΓ ∀y¬¬(∃xϕ(x, y) → ∃x(ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀z < x¬ϕ(z, y))).
Proof The second proof in [TD, p.131] works.
Proof To show iop W ¬¬lop, it remains to argue that iop is m-closed under the negative translation. It is easy to see that each of the following schemes is provable in minimal logic: [TS, p.35] and [Da, p.162] for some of these, where, e.g., the intuitionistic proof in the latter for ¬¬A ∧ ¬¬B → ¬¬(A ∧ B) works in minimal logic too. These can be used to show that each axiom of P A − , m-proves its negative translation. Furthermore for any formula ϕ, (I x (ϕ)) − = I x (ϕ − ) and if ϕ is open, then so is ϕ − .
For the converse, we give a model-theoretic proof. Let α be a node of a Kripke model K W ¬¬lop, ϕ(x, y) an open formula, and a ∈ M α of the same arity as y. To prove α I x ϕ(x, a), assume without loss of generality that α ϕ(0, a). By lemma 4.4 and [AM, 1.2(iii)], it is enough to show that for every β ≥ α, there exists δ ≥ β such that for all η ≥ δ, M η I x ϕ(x, a). Fix β ≥ α. If for all γ ≥ β, M γ ∀xϕ(x, a), then we may take δ = β. Otherwise, by β W ¬¬lop, 7 Note that K ∃y(¬AEO → ∃x(x + 1) 2 = 2y 2 ) and K , the result of applying Smorynski's -operation to K, does not force ν.
there will exist γ ≥ β such that γ ¬¬(∃x¬ϕ(x, a) ∧ ∀z < xϕ(z, a)). In particular, for some δ ≥ γ and some d ∈ M δ , δ ¬ϕ(d, a) ∧ ∀z < dϕ(z, a). Clearly, such a node δ has the desired property.
From proposition 6.1, one can also conclude that iΠ 1 W ¬¬lΠ 1 .
Proof Take an arbitrary parameter-free open formula ϕ(x). It is easy to see that, over (P A − ) i , it is equivalent to a formula of the form ∨ i≤m ∧ j≤n P i,j (x) ≥ Q i,j (x), where all P i,j (x) and Q i,j (x)'s are in N [x] . Let K be a Kripke model of (P A − ) i and α a node of K such that α ∃x ∨ i≤m ∧ j≤n P i,j (x) ≥ Q i,j (x). Then, for some a ∈ M α , M α ∨ i≤m ∧ j≤n P i,j (a) ≥ Q i,j (a). It is enough to show that there exists q ∈ N such that M α ∨ i≤m ∧ j≤n P i,j (q) ≥ Q i,j (q). Suppose not (which implies that a is nonstandard). Then for all q ∈ N and i ≤ m, there exists j ≤ n such that M α P i,j (q) < Q i,j (q). From here, for each i ≤ m, we see the existence of j i ≤ n such that for infinitely many q ∈ N, M α P i,j i (q) < Q i,j i (q). This shows that for each i ≤ m, the leading coefficient of P i,j i (x) − Q i,j i (x) ∈ Z[x] is negative which contradicts M α ∨ i≤m ∧ j≤n P i,j (a) ≥ Q i,j (a).
Remark. The above proof heavily relies on ϕ being parameter-free. For example, iop ¬¬L y (2y > x) implies in particular that (P A − ) i L y (2y−x ≥ 0). There are suitable parametersubstitutions like t ∈ Z[t] ≥0 P A − for x so that the resulting polynomial 2y − t has positive leading coefficient with respect to y but is still negative for all y ∈ N.
Proposition 6.4 We have iop ≡ i t op, i∀ 1 ≡ i t ∀ 1 and iΠ 1 ≡ i t Π 1 .
Proof First note that, as observed in the proof of [AM, 1.4] , Iop ≡ Lop and it follows from our next paragraph below that, for any class Γ of formulas closed under ¬, LΓ ≡ I t Γ. Therefore, Iop ≡ I t op. Also, for any ϕ, I t x ϕ c I x ϕ and if Γ is a class of formulas closed under bounded universal quantifications, then IΓ I t Γ. So, I∀ 1 ≡ I t ∀ 1 and IΠ 1 ≡ I t Π 1 . For both directions in each of the three intuitionistic versions, use the corresponding classical equivalence, closure of all theories mentioned above under the negative translation and finally (P A − ) i ϕ − ↔ ϕ for open ϕ and the same for i∆ 0 and ∆ 0 formulas.
For every formula ϕ = ϕ(x, y) in the language of arithmetic or any expansion of it, we have c L x ¬ϕ ↔ I t x ϕ. In fact, L x ¬ϕ + P EM ϕ i I t x ϕ, since L x ¬ϕ + P EM ϕ i ∀y(¬∃x(¬ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀z < xϕ(z, y)) → ¬∃x¬ϕ(x, y)) i ∀y(∀x¬(¬ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀z < xϕ(z, y)) → ∀x¬¬ϕ(x, y)) and ∀y(∀x¬(¬ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀z < xϕ(z, y)) → ∀x¬¬ϕ(x, y)) + P EM ϕ i I t x ϕ(x, y). On the other hand, I t x ϕ + P EM ϕ i L x ¬ϕ. Indeed, i t op ≡ i iop L x ¬(2x ≤ y). Let us observe that there are atomic formulas ϕ in the expansion of the language of arithmetic by a new predicate symbol R such that L x ¬ϕ i I t x ϕ. To see this, consider the ω-framed Kripke structure for this expanded language, where the nth world is the expansion of the L-structure Z[t] ≥0 by interpreting R as N ∪ {t − n, t − n + 1, · · · , t}. The instance L x (¬R(x)) is forced at every node n, since n ¬R(t+1)∧∀x < (t+1)¬¬R(x). Clearly the root forces ∀x(∀z < xR(z) → R(x))∧¬∀xR(x).
